George F. Kennan - U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. Foreign Policy: 1890-2000

Jun 25, 2025

“It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.”

George F. Kennan’s greatest strength was his ability to understand the Kremlin’s worldview better than any of his American peers. His main weakness was his inability to control the United States’ governmental and diplomatic apparatus.

After the studious Kennan graduated from Princeton, he passed the fiercely competitive application process for the Foreign Service. During a posting in Berlin he was tutored by Russian émigrés, which sparked an obsession with Russia’s history and culture.

Fluent in Russian, Kennan’s language skills were impressive, but his true mastery lay in analysing the psychology of the Soviet leadership and describing the adversary that the U.S. faced.

In 1946 Kennan produced his ‘Long Telegram’, which has been referred to as the ‘most famous communication in the history of the State Department’. In his endeavour to teach Washington the underlying views of Stalin’s Communist Party, Kennan unwittingly set the overarching U.S. foreign policy strategy for the following forty years. His writing largely formed the strategy of ‘containment’, which was adopted in some form by the subsequent eight presidents. Ironically, it would be Kennan who had serious misgivings over the use of his strategic concept.

Kennan’s time at the forefront of policy-making was surprisingly brief. However, during those influential years in the mid to late 1940s, he provided the intellectual framework for the U.S. Cold War strategy. A strategy that would remain in place until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Kennan’s ideology:

Primarily a realist, Kennan prioritised flexibility in foreign policy, and he therefore disliked multinational organisations such as the United Nations and NATO, which he believed resulted in entangling commitments.

Kennan maintained that the fall of Central and Eastern European nations to Germany in the lead-up to World War Two was a product of Wilsonian idealism. Wilsonianism had dismantled the Habsburg Empire in the name of self-determination, and for Kennan this had produced smaller, weaker states which were vulnerable to attack. Ultimately, Kennan detested idealism in foreign policy. The U.S. should not attempt to export its values but instead address its own problems and protect its national interests.

Kennan urged diplomacy above all else - he was confident in his intellectual abilities and trusted that creative statecraft would be sufficient in most circumstances to advance national interests. A powerful military was certainly a component of the diplomatic toolkit and necessary to protect against an aggressive adversary, it should, however, be used as a last resort. In other words, U.S. diplomacy should be revered as much as its military or economic prowess.

There was an elitist strand to Kennan’s diplomacy, and he believed that only top intellectuals within the Foreign Service could effectively conduct U.S. international affairs. For Kennan, politicians were solely concerned with re-election, and this made them biased or ineffective with regards to foreign policy.

His elitism even exhibited glimpses of authoritarianism. Kennan did not believe democracies could undertake long-term strategic foreign policy due to the nature of their electoral cycles and the possibility of administration change. Democracies were therefore at a disadvantage to authoritarian regimes that kept a firm hold on power and consistent foreign policy objectives. Reflecting on his time as Director of Policy Planning, Kennan encapsulated this view by commenting, ‘No two people had the same idea of what it was that we were trying to achieve.’

Intriguingly, Kennan’s views contained major contradictions at pivotal moments during the Cold War. He was no great proponent of international law and did not shy away from occasional underhand tactics, however, he was also prone to periods of emotional and philosophical conflict. Perhaps the clearest example was when he opposed the development of a hydrogen bomb on moral grounds, despite the knowledge that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb of their own. This conclusion did not reflect his typical pragmatic evaluation of circumstances.

Post-war balance of power:

The global balance of power after the war was totally different from that which preceded it, and the bipolar world predicted so often throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-century finally arrived.

The wartime allies speculated over how their relations would evolve; multiple territories were under occupation from allied forces; there were questions over how to restore borders; and there were decisions to be made on Germany’s reintegration into the European system.

Kennan’s early warnings about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

Whilst Kennan abhorred the notion that a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation was inevitable, he did not believe that relations would remain harmonious. He doubted that the Soviet leadership would engage in future American initiatives, at least not in any significant manner. Kennan therefore told Charles Bohlen - Counselor of the State Department - that the U.S. could not loiter in the ‘clouds of Wilsonian idealism’. It was ‘wishful thinking’ that the future of Europe could be decided on a friendly basis with the USSR.

By May 1945, Kennan felt that Britain, France and the U.S. would have to join their German zones of occupation to form a non-communist West German state. He did not believe that President Truman could control communist influence in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, and an even more remote possibility was joint aims with Moscow on Germany’s future. A ‘sphere of influence’ policy was considered the best bet. Kennan even opposed the exhaustive denazification of Germany, feeling that their numbers were so large, to remove all Nazi members from society would threaten Germany’s recovery and leave it vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. Aside from the moral abhorrence, this appeared impractical - trying to monitor and control two dangerous groups would be an impossible balancing act. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was not at the time receptive to Kennan’s suggestion of a West German state and dismissed his concerns.

Harriman was replaced by General Walter Bedell Smith in early 1946, but Kennan continued to provide counsel. Bedell claimed Kennan was a ‘mentor and principal adviser during my first months in Moscow.’ Even with the change of ambassador, however, Washington’s attitude toward Soviet relations continued to be one of hoping for the best. Over the next twelve months, U.S. officials grew increasingly perplexed by the USSR and grappled with their understanding of Soviet actions.

In 1946, the Treasury Department asked for analysis on why Moscow seemed unwilling to cooperate with the World Bank. The naivety of the Treasury in asking why the USSR, a communist power, would not deal with a capitalist institution astounded Kennan. Frustrated by their lack of insight into Soviet modus operandi, Kennan was determined to hit home his assertions about the Communist Party leadership. He composed his thoughts in no less than 5,500 words.

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The Long Telegram:

Key assertions in Kennan’s famous ‘Long Telegram’ were:

The Communist Party’s belief was that the USSR was surrounded by capitalist countries and ‘in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.’ The USSR would therefore advance its strength wherever possible in international society, and attempt to ‘reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.’

Kennan conveyed that ‘At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity’. He added that the ‘Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face.’

Despite the warnings on the Soviet outlook and their predicted tactics, Kennan stated that ‘If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion, "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia.’

He reiterated this sentiment again: ‘I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict’.

Overall, Kennan felt that given an opportunity to increase Soviet power or limit U.S. influence, Stalin would ruthlessly pursue it. However, with clear boundaries, the post-war world could remain peaceful.

Reception to Kennan’s Telegram:

The telegram has been referred to as the ‘most famous communication in the history of the State Department.’ Its importance cannot be understated, it transformed Kennan’s career and set the tone for superpower relations over the next forty years.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was particularly impressed by the argument put forth by Kennan. He promoted its circulation amongst U.S. embassies worldwide and it was read by President Truman himself.

Even Soviet intelligence accessed the telegram. Stalin subsequently ordered Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, to prepare a telegram of his own. The telegram unsurprisingly asserted that U.S. foreign policy centered around ‘monopolistic capitalism’ and America strived for ‘world supremacy’.

Fundamentally, Kennan was not detailing a precise and specific strategy when he composed the telegram in 1946, nevertheless, it was hard hitting and its main tenets rapidly gained influence in Washington.

Kennan’s speaking tour:

Following the telegram, Kennan was asked to spread his message to the American public, and he began lecturing at the National War College and other military installations around the country. Although his ideas were still in the earliest stages of development, Kennan believed it was vital to instill an appreciation for the complexity of international relations and the benefits of diplomacy.

Although buoyed by his new purpose, in mid-1946 Kennan was concerned that the Soviet threat was becoming increasingly exaggerated. After all, Soviet iron and steel production was less than half of its prewar level; cities were destroyed; and the Kremlin was preoccupied with managing eighty million subjugated people in Eastern Europe. At one lecture Kennan therefore remarked, ‘I deplore the hysterical sort of anticommunism which, it seems to me, is gaining currency in our country’.

A few months later, a paper by Edward Willett, studying the relationship between Marxism and the actions of the USSR, was forwarded to Kennan for comment. Kennan strenuously objected to Willett's argument that military measures were necessary to guarantee peace and security. In a previous lecture, ‘Measures Short of War’, Kennan had listed the various non-military tools that the U.S. had at their disposal to counter the Soviets. Instead, Kennan declared that diplomatic ‘counter-pressure’ remained the best tactic to nullify Soviet actions. Forrestal was again impressed by Kennan’s analysis and recommended that he should head up the State Department’s new Policy Planning Staff.

Following recommendations, Secretary of State George Marshall extended an invitation to Kennan to become the Director of Policy Planning in 1947. His fast-growing reputation had positioned him in the highest echelons of the foreign policy apparatus.

The Truman Doctrine:

In February of 1947, Britain signalled to the U.S. that it no longer had the capacity to support Greece and Turkey against communist insurgencies. Since reading the Long Telegram, Truman had kept a careful eye on reports of Soviet activity. One such report by Kennan had analysed an interview between the U.S. ambassador to China and Stalin, and had highlighted Soviet intentions of ‘the achievement of maximum power, with minimum responsibility.’ Truman reflected in his memoirs that, ‘I realized only too well the implications in this message—and in other related messages as well.’ This perhaps explains why Truman agreed to fill the void left by the British in the Mediterranean. In declaring U.S. support, Truman made a landmark foreign policy speech that formed the basis of the ‘Truman Doctrine’.

Although Truman’s speech drew ideas from the Long Telegram, it had gone too far in Kennan’s assessment. Instead of language focusing solely on upholding democracy in Greece and Turkey, Truman had veered into universal ideals and indicated that the U.S. would support free peoples globally. Vague language would lead to expansive policy, and this would hamper U.S. diplomatic flexibility. Kennan - who had previously opposed the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which formed the United Nations - felt that the U.S. was becoming entrapped by idealistic slogans, and that Truman’s policy foreshadowed a dangerous global commitment. In Kennan’s eyes, Truman’s simplistic anticommunism had distorted his strategic suggestions.

The Sources of Soviet Conduct:

Kennan may have sensed an opportunity to course-correct the direction that U.S. policy was heading. After hearing Kennan’s lectures, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs, approached Kennan with a request for an article. Kennan obliged and hurriedly reworked his analysis of Willett’s article into one entitled, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct.’ The decision to let Kennan submit his article to Foreign Affairs in July 1947 was made by a middle level office in the State Department and was cleared through bureaucratic routine. The one condition was that the article should be published anonymously under the author ‘X’.

In Foreign Affairs Kennan explained of the Soviets, ‘It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a certain date.’ He therefore elaborated that the cornerstone of U.S. policy ‘must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’

In Kennan’s view, the U.S. did not need to eject the communists from power in Moscow, or even in Eastern Europe, Washington simply had to wait. The Soviet system was not born out of strength, and it would collapse due to its own fragility, not because of a military confrontation. Kennan was adamant that the U.S. should uphold its own values, for a betrayal of American principles would be the factor most likely to cause defeat in any rivalry.

It could be argued that Kennan’s call for patience was not explicit enough. Instructions to counter the Soviets ‘at every point’ conversely suggested a very active posturing. By failing to clearly detail the methods the U.S. should use, he left the article prone to misinterpretation.

Reaction to the ‘policy of firm containment’:

The publication of Kennan’s article had major ramifications. The true author was soon revealed as the Director of Policy Planning, and it therefore came to be seen as official U.S. policy. The article also stirred the American public, garnering popular support for the Truman administration’s firm actions towards the USSR.

Some critics, like journalist Walter Lippmann interpreted containment as a confrontationist policy. Lippmann launched a scathing criticism of the article, asserting that no group should expect U.S. support simply due to the threat of communism. Lippmann further accused the article of misguided confidence in the frailty of the Soviet system. In summary, he labelled Kennan’s views a ‘strategic monstrosity’ and published his critique in a book entitled, The Cold War.

Despite the criticism, the article had supplemented the Long Telegram. Although it was a misleading version of Kennan’s overall view, the following eight presidents would adhere to this policy to some extent.

Kennan’s frustration:

Kennan’s influence was reaching its zenith, but he agonised that his views were being pulled further away from their original meaning. He happened to agree with much of Lippmann’s critique and set about a response for clarification.

Kennan argued that the initial execution of containment had been political and economical, not militarised or confrontational. Turkey and Greece had been sent only economic aid, not troops, and had resisted communism.

Kennan also denied that he proposed to resist the Soviets in every location around the globe. He wrote that ‘there was a good sporting chance that we would be able to hold in enough places, and in sufficiently strategic places, to accomplish our general purpose.’

Kennan attempted to be more specific over which U.S. interests should be considered strategically vital, and eventually concluded that a balance of power on the European continent was the highest priority. If all European powers were required to look over their shoulder at the other, then ‘neither will be able to risk the diversionary effort of an attack on the North Atlantic community, with which we stand or fall.’

Ultimately, Kennan’s rebuttal to Lippmann was not published. His article in Foreign Affairs had caused embarrassment for the State Department, and he may have decided to follow Marshall's strict guideline that ‘planners don't talk.’

Containment in action:

Financial aid by way of the Marshall Plan was viewed by Kennan as a perfect method of containment, and he played a central role in its design. Marshall had directed Kennan to present suggestions on European reconstruction, and in close collaboration with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton, Kennan helped to devise the ‘European Recovery Program’. Rebuilding the industries and cities of Europe and Japan would make those populations far less tempted by communist doctrines and local socialist parties. By also offering the plan to the Soviet Union it would demonstrate political cooperation.

As predicted by Kennan, Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan due to the political conditions attached to it – joining the programme would be to accept the superiority of capitalism over communism. In September 1947, Stalin had established Cominform to consolidate authority over the Eastern European satellite governments. As a result, when he later forced those governments to reject the offer of U.S. economic aid, Kennan forecasted that it would foment unrest among those populations towards the Soviet leadership.

The Berlin Airlift by U.S. and British air forces to supply their zones of occupation was yet another example of innovative policy. In 1948, Stalin enforced a blockade of Berlin in response to the increasing cohesion of allied zones and the announcement of a new currency for Western Germany. Aside from winning the support of Berliners, the airlift again demonstrated how the U.S. and its allies could execute containment whilst averting military escalation and open conflict. Although the airlift was a logistical masterpiece, Kennan did worry that growing division would make the reintegration of Soviet satellite states impossible in future. Containment was preventing the spread of communism in Europe, but the Cold War was intensifying.

In 1948, when Stalin supported Czech communists and helped them overthrow their democratic government, Kennan’s theories about Soviet ambitions to increase its strength wherever possible continued to play out in reality. Fearing the long reach of the Kremlin’s influence, the newly formed CIA were tasked with undermining communist parties in Europe. They were instructed to act in a way whereby responsibility could be denied by Washington. Kennan was initially in favour of some of these covert operations - evidence that he was not averse to diplomatic dark arts. Soon however, Kennan was lobbying that the State Department had oversight on CIA activities to ensure that ‘plausible deniability’ would not entail the removal of all restraint. Kennan’s pleas for restraint were not heard, and the budget for CIA activities ballooned from $4.7 million to $82 million within three years.

The formation of NATO:

In 1949, Dean Acheson replaced Marshall as secretary of state, this was unfortunate for Kennan, for he and Marshall held a congenial relationship. In his new position, Acheson soon played a pivotal role in the forming of NATO. Kennan once again appealed against the militarisation of containment and stated that the U.S. was not acting rationally. Despite supporting the unification of allied zones in 1945, Kennan had since altered his view, and proposed the withdrawal of American troops on the condition that the Soviets accepted German reunification. Acheson vehemently disagreed and preferred that a separate West German state be integrated into the Atlantic community.

Kennan feared NATO would grow as an organisation and include countries not directly connected to Western security. This proved true, first with Turkey in 1952, and it appeared that the U.S. had inadvertently entered into an ever-widening security commitment. For Kennan, the growth of NATO would also alarm the Soviets, who had their own rational security fears; it would cause them to tighten their grip on Eastern Europe, entrench the division of Europe, and make disengagement a distant prospect. Instead, Kennan believed any American commitment to European security should be specific in nature and limited in time.

When Kennan criticised NATO years later, he was denounced by Acheson who barbed that “Mr. Kennan has never, in my judgment, grasped the realities of power relationships, but takes a rather mystical attitude toward them. To Mr. Kennan there is no Soviet military threat in Europe.”

Acheson’s insult highlighted Kennan’s main weakness. For all his insight, Kennan failed to recognise that politics was more than winning a battle of ideas, it needed practical manoeuvring to produce results, even if this required compromising on intellectual purity.

Disillusionment with government:

By November 1949, Kennan was despondent with the manner that U.S. foreign policy was being conducted. For him, the government had not countered the Soviet threat in the correct manner and he ‘recognised that my planning staff, started nearly three years ago, has simply been a failure’.

As Kennan’s influence waned, Paul Nitze was assuming the throne as the most influential thinker on national security. President Truman had requested a reassessment of strategic plans due to the Soviet Union’s potential fission bomb capabilities, and Nitze had produced a report named NSC-68, full to the brim with figures and data. The report recommended that the U.S. undergo a major increase in military spending on both its conventional and nuclear forces.

Kennan was infuriated by the report, and ‘disgusted about the assumptions concerning Soviet intentions.’ Unfortunately, Kennan’s deteriorating relationship with Acheson and his perceived moderate stance towards the USSR was pushing him to the fringes of decision making.

David Milne’s excellent book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy, recounts an event which effectively signalled the end of any significant foreign policy input from Kennan. After detecting the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb test in late 1949, top U.S. government officials agonised over whether to approve development of a hydrogen bomb. Acheson asked both Kennan and Nitze to come up with their suggestions.

Kennan eventually produced a seventy-nine page document littered with philosophical and moral rhetoric which argued against building the bomb. On the other hand, Nitze used a data-driven and scientific approach that proclaimed peace was guaranteed through strength and the bomb should be developed. Kennan, so often viewed as a realist, was in this instance displaying an emotional reaction. Acheson deplored Kennan’s proposal and began to question his judgement on national security, feeling that his suggestions were often politically impractical. Whereas Acheson and Nitze pivoted policy so that it would pass through Congress, Kennan stuck adamantly to his convictions. Soon Kennan was questioning his role within the State Department and considered leaving government altogether.

Kennan’s Legacy:

Kennan served stints as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and would be consulted periodically for advice throughout the remainder of his career. Nothing, however, came remotely close to the lasting influence of containment.

Containment was the U.S. strategy of the Cold War. Although its application was a slightly warped view of the original argument set forth by Kennan, he was undeniably the architect. Containment in the general sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence was implemented by the subsequent eight administrations, who all produced their own strain of Kennan’s policy. It was the reasoning for U.S. intervention in Korea, Vietnam and beyond.

Kennan’s views will continue to be polarising - they were astute to some, unbalanced and hypocritical to others.

In the 1960s Kennan once again repudiated the common understanding of containment, claiming it was more subtle and nuanced than many understood. Some scholars charged Kennan with knowing the implications of his telegram, but attempting to retrospectively change interpretations and excuse himself of liability for actions which led to the Vietnam War. This seems an unfair accusation when we assess Kennan’s near constant lobbying to exercise restraint, and his arguments to many within the State Department between 1946 and 1949 that the U.S. was overreacting.

It would be more accurate to say that Kennan was clumsy in the manner with which he shared his assessments and analysis. He was an intellectual, not an adept bureaucrat, and was unable to rein in decision-makers to carry out his strategy more precisely. His unwillingness to compromise with the realities of modern geopolitics often frustrated his superiors, such as Harriman and Acheson.

Even if Kennan was a more adroit politician, it is debatable whether he could have pulled the U.S. back from what he perceived as overreaction. He must be judged within the context of his time, in which the dawn of the nuclear age had transformed the psychology of the international arena.

When it comes to George F. Kennan, one thing is undeniable. His analysis of the Kremlin’s views dictated the dynamics of perhaps the greatest ever geopolitical rivalry.